The question of who determines the ethical boundaries for artificial intelligence (AI) models—particularly large language models (LLMs)—is both urgent and complex. As LLMs have become increasingly capable and widely deployed, their responses to ethically charged prompts (such as planning a crime) have shifted from compliance to resistance, reflecting evolving ethical constraints. This transformation is not the result of a single authority or ethical tradition, but rather emerges from a confluence of actors, processes, and philosophical tensions. This essay critically examines the sources and mechanisms by which ethical norms are embedded in AI models, drawing on recent academic literature in AI alignment, technology studies, regulatory theory, and philosophy.
The Multi-Layered Sources of AI Ethics
1. Developers and Corporate Governance
At the most immediate level, the ethical boundaries of LLMs are set by the organizations that design, train, and deploy them. Major AI companies such as OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft have established internal governance structures—ethics boards, advisory committees, and responsible AI teams—that oversee the development and deployment of AI systems (Floridi et al. 2018; Mittelstadt 2019). These bodies articulate ethical principles (e.g., fairness, transparency, non-maleficence) and operationalize them through codes of conduct, risk assessments, and technical safeguards (Morley et al. 2021). The values embedded in these frameworks are shaped by a combination of corporate culture, public image concerns, and the professional backgrounds of the developers and ethicists involved (Jones 2022).
However, the process is not value-neutral. As the literature on “embedded values” in technology design demonstrates, the organizational culture, disciplinary practices, and even tacit knowledge of development teams play a significant role in determining which values are prioritized and how they are interpreted (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996; Jones 2022). For example, a company that prioritizes rapid innovation may embed different ethical trade-offs than one that emphasizes risk aversion or social responsibility.
2. Human Feedback and Reinforcement Learning
A central mechanism for encoding ethical boundaries in LLMs is Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). In this process, human annotators evaluate model outputs for qualities such as helpfulness, safety, and appropriateness, and these judgments are used to fine-tune the model (Christiano et al. 2017; Bai et al. 2022). RLHF allows for the incorporation of nuanced, context-dependent ethical judgments that are difficult to formalize mathematically. It also enables iterative refinement, as models are updated in response to new forms of misuse or shifting societal expectations (Ouyang et al. 2022).
Yet, RLHF is not immune to bias. The ethical standards encoded through human feedback reflect the perspectives, backgrounds, and cultural assumptions of the annotators, who are often drawn from specific (frequently Western) populations (Gabriel 2020). This can result in the marginalization of minority or non-Western ethical perspectives, raising concerns about the global legitimacy of AI ethics (Birhane et al. 2022).
3. Regulatory and Legal Frameworks
The ethical constraints on LLMs are also shaped by external regulatory and legal requirements. Governments and international organizations have developed a range of frameworks—such as the EU AI Act, the U.S. AI Bill of Rights, and UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of AI—that mandate transparency, fairness, accountability, and respect for human rights in AI systems (Veale and Borgesius 2021; Floridi 2023). These regulations often require companies to conduct ethical impact assessments, document decision-making processes, and provide mechanisms for redress.
Regulatory influence is not uniform across jurisdictions, leading to a patchwork of standards that companies must navigate. In practice, many AI developers adopt the most stringent applicable standards (often those of the EU) as a baseline, resulting in a form of “regulatory universalism” that may not reflect local cultural values (Wachter et al. 2021).
4. Philosophical and Societal Influences
Beneath these institutional layers lies a deeper philosophical tension between universalism and relativism in AI ethics. Universalist approaches argue for the primacy of fundamental moral principles—such as human dignity, fairness, and non-maleficence—across all contexts (Floridi and Cowls 2019). These are often codified in international human rights instruments and serve as the foundation for many AI ethics guidelines.
In contrast, relativist perspectives emphasize the importance of cultural, historical, and situational factors in shaping ethical norms (Mittelstadt 2019). The challenge for AI developers is to balance these competing demands: to embed universal principles that protect against harm and discrimination, while remaining sensitive to local values and practices. Hybrid approaches, which establish core ethical commitments but allow for contextual adaptation, are increasingly favored in both academic and policy circles (Jobin, Ienca, and Vayena 2019).
The Evolution of Ethical Constraints in LLMs
The shift in LLM behavior—from compliance with ethically dubious prompts to active resistance—reflects the dynamic and iterative nature of AI ethics. Early models, trained primarily on large internet datasets, mirrored the diversity (and sometimes toxicity) of online discourse. As incidents of misuse became apparent, developers introduced more robust safeguards, including RLHF, content filters, and explicit refusals to engage in illegal or harmful activities (Bai et al. 2022). These changes were driven by a combination of public pressure, regulatory scrutiny, and internal ethical deliberation.
Recent research has also explored more transparent and participatory approaches to AI alignment, such as “Constitutional AI,” where high-level ethical principles are explicitly encoded and subject to public input (Askell et al. 2021). However, the challenge of ensuring that these principles are legitimate, robust, and adaptable remains unresolved.
Critical Reflections
While the current approach to AI ethics prioritizes safety, legality, and broadly accepted moral standards, it is not without limitations. The reliance on corporate governance and Western-centric regulatory frameworks risks perpetuating dominant values at the expense of marginalized perspectives. The opacity of RLHF and other alignment techniques complicates efforts to audit and contest the ethical boundaries of AI systems. Moreover, the exclusion of user choice in ethical frameworks—while justified by concerns about safety and misuse—raises questions about autonomy and pluralism in digital societies.
Conclusion
The ethical boundaries of AI models are set by a complex interplay of corporate governance, human feedback, regulatory mandates, and philosophical commitments. No single actor or tradition “tells” AI what is or is not ethical; rather, these boundaries emerge from ongoing negotiation among developers, regulators, annotators, and society at large. As AI systems become more pervasive and influential, the challenge will be to ensure that their ethical constraints are transparent, legitimate, and responsive to the diversity of human values.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
Askell, Amanda, Yuntao Bai, and Saurav Kadavath. 2021. “A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignment.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.00861.
Bai, Yuntao, et al. 2022. “Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.05862.
Birhane, Abeba, et al. 2022. “The Values Encoded in Machine Learning Research.” Patterns 3, no. 8: 100588.
Christiano, Paul F., et al. 2017. “Deep Reinforcement Learning from Human Preferences.” Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30.
Floridi, Luciano, and Josh Cowls. 2019. “A Unified Framework of Five Principles for AI in Society.” Harvard Data Science Review 1, no. 1.
Floridi, Luciano, et al. 2018. “AI4People—An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations.” Minds and Machines 28, no. 4: 689–707.
Friedman, Batya, and Helen Nissenbaum. 1996. “Bias in Computer Systems.” ACM Transactions on Information Systems 14, no. 3: 330–347.
Gabriel, Iason. 2020. “Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignment.” Minds and Machines 30, no. 3: 411–437.
Jobin, Anna, Marcello Ienca, and Effy Vayena. 2019. “The Global Landscape of AI Ethics Guidelines.” Nature Machine Intelligence 1, no. 9: 389–399.
Jones, Peter H. 2022. “Values Conflicts in Software Innovation: Negotiating Embedded Ethics in Organizational Processes.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 9, no. 1: 1–23.
Morley, Jessica, et al. 2021. “From What to How: An Initial Review of Publicly Available AI Ethics Tools, Methods and Research to Translate Principles into Practices.” Ethics and Information Technology 23, no. 3: 293–306.
Ouyang, Long, et al. 2022. “Training Language Models to Follow Instructions with Human Feedback.” Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: 27730–27744.
Veale, Michael, and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius. 2021. “Demystifying the Draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act.” Computer Law Review International 22, no. 4: 97–112.
Wachter, Sandra, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell. 2021. “Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI.” Computer Law & Security Review 41: 105567.
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) have catalyzed a profound reorientation in American constitutional interpretation. Both cases, though arising from distinct doctrinal contexts—Second Amendment rights and abortion, respectively—signal a decisive turn away from precedent-based balancing and toward a methodology that privileges history and tradition as the primary arbiters of constitutional meaning. Yet, as leading legal scholarship demonstrates, this shift is neither unproblematic nor internally consistent. In this article, I analyze the constitutional reasoning in Bruen and Dobbs, critically engage with the emerging scholarly critiques, and propose a new interpretive frame: a Contextualized Historical-Structural Approach that seeks to reconcile the virtues of historical inquiry with the demands of principled, transparent, and adaptable constitutional adjudication.
I. The Turn to History and Tradition: Methodological Convergence and Divergence
Both Bruen and Dobbs exemplify the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on history and tradition as the touchstone for constitutional rights. In Bruen, the Court rejected the familiar two-step, means-end scrutiny for Second Amendment cases, instead requiring that modern gun regulations be justified by direct analogy to historical practices. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, insisted that the government must “affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms” (Blocher and Ruben 2025, 1782). Similarly, in Dobbs, the majority, led by Justice Alito, grounded its rejection of a constitutional right to abortion in the absence of such a right in the nation’s “history and tradition,” concluding that abortion was not “deeply rooted” in the American legal tradition at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification (Schneller et al. 2024, 312).
Despite this methodological convergence, the cases diverge in their treatment of precedent and the scope of judicial power. Bruen is evolutionary, building on District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) without overturning longstanding precedent, whereas Dobbs is revolutionary, explicitly discarding nearly fifty years of precedent and signaling a willingness to revisit other substantive due process rights (Columbia Law Review 2025, 1123). This divergence underscores the Court’s selective deployment of history and tradition, raising questions about the coherence and legitimacy of its interpretive methodology.
II. Critiques of the Historical-Analogical Method
Legal scholars have subjected the Court’s new historical-analogical approach to searching critique. Blocher and Ruben (2025) argue that Bruen’s “originalism-by-analogy” does not, in practice, constrain judicial discretion; rather, it enables subjectivity and unpredictability, as courts struggle to identify relevant historical analogues for modern regulations. The lack of clear standards for what constitutes a “sufficiently similar” historical law has led to inconsistent outcomes in lower courts, with empirical studies documenting doctrinal instability and unpredictability (Blocher and Ruben 2025, 1790; “One Year Post-Bruen” 2023).
Similarly, the historical inquiry in Dobbs has been criticized for its selective and sometimes ahistorical use of the past. Schneller et al. (2024) contend that the majority’s account of abortion’s legal status at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment is contestable and that the decision’s narrow reading of substantive due process threatens the security of other unenumerated rights. The Court’s approach, they argue, risks reducing constitutional interpretation to a contest over historical narratives, with little guidance for resolving conflicts in the historical record (Schneller et al. 2024, 320).
Moreover, recent scholarship has identified a “hidden equality analysis” at work in both cases: when faced with conflicting historical traditions, the Court quietly applies reasoning akin to equal protection analysis, sometimes treating outlier laws as constitutionally suspect and sometimes incorporating them into the tradition (Columbia Law Review 2025, 1135). This implicit balancing, masked as neutral historical inquiry, undermines the transparency and predictability of constitutional adjudication.
III. The Limits of Existing Interpretive Frameworks
The ascendancy of history and tradition in Bruen and Dobbs reflects the dominance of originalism in contemporary constitutional theory. Yet, as Barnett and Solum (2023) and others have noted, originalism itself is not monolithic; it encompasses a range of approaches, from “public meaning” originalism to “framework originalism,” each with different implications for judicial discretion and adaptability. Critics of originalism warn that rigid historicism may fail to address contemporary problems, while living constitutionalism is faulted for granting judges excessive discretion (Barnett and Solum 2023, 145; Baude and Sachs 2022, 102).
The Court’s recent decisions expose the limitations of both approaches. The historical-analogical method, as applied in Bruen and Dobbs, neither fully constrains judicial discretion nor provides a principled basis for resolving novel constitutional questions. At the same time, the rejection of balancing tests and the narrowing of substantive due process threaten to erode the protection of fundamental rights not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution (Schneller et al. 2024, 325).
IV. Toward a Contextualized Historical-Structural Approach
In light of these developments, I propose a new interpretive frame: the Contextualized Historical-Structural Approach. This framework seeks to integrate the insights of historical inquiry with the structural principles and purposes of the Constitution, while maintaining transparency and adaptability in constitutional adjudication.
First, this approach recognizes the value of history and tradition as sources of constitutional meaning, but insists that historical analysis must be contextualized—attentive to the social, political, and technological changes that shape the application of constitutional principles. Rather than searching for direct analogues, courts should identify the underlying purposes and values animating historical practices and assess their relevance to contemporary circumstances (Blocher and Ruben 2025, 1802).
Second, the approach incorporates structural analysis, examining how constitutional provisions interact with one another and with the broader architecture of government. This structural perspective enables courts to consider the implications of their decisions for federalism, separation of powers, and the protection of individual rights, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of narrow textualism or selective historicism (Barnett and Solum 2023, 150).
Third, the Contextualized Historical-Structural Approach demands transparency in judicial reasoning. When historical evidence is ambiguous or contested, courts should candidly acknowledge the limits of historical inquiry and articulate the normative principles guiding their decisions. This transparency fosters legitimacy and predictability, while allowing for principled adaptation to new challenges (Columbia Law Review 2025, 1140).
Finally, this approach encourages a dialogic relationship between courts and the political branches, recognizing that constitutional meaning is shaped not only by judicial interpretation but also by democratic deliberation and social practice. By situating constitutional adjudication within this broader context, the framework balances respect for tradition with the need for constitutional evolution.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bruen and Dobbs mark a watershed in American constitutional interpretation, entrenching history and tradition as the primary arbiters of constitutional rights. Yet, as leading scholarship reveals, the Court’s historical-analogical method is fraught with indeterminacy and subjectivity, threatening both the coherence and legitimacy of constitutional law. The Contextualized Historical-Structural Approach offers a way forward: by integrating historical inquiry with structural analysis and transparent reasoning, it provides a principled and adaptable framework for constitutional adjudication in a changing society.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
Barnett, Randy E., and Lawrence B. Solum. 2023. “Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: The Role of History and Tradition.” Northwestern University Law Review 117: 143–188.
Blocher, Joseph, and Eric Ruben. 2025. “Originalism-by-Analogy and Second Amendment Adjudication.” Yale Law Journal 134: 1775–1832.
Columbia Law Review. 2025. “How Bruen and Dobbs Resolved Opposing Historical Traditions Through Hidden Equal Protection Analysis.” Columbia Law Review 125: 1121–1150.
Schneller, Hillary A., Diana Kasdan, Risa E. Kaufman, and Alexander Wilson. 2024. “Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization: Reckoning with its Impact and Charting a Path Forward.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 26: 311–355.
“One Year Post-Bruen: An Empirical Assessment.” 2023. Duke Law Journal 72: 201–245.
Baude, William, and Stephen E. Sachs. 2022. “Originalism and the Law of the Past.” Law and History Review 40: 101–130.
The concepts of “freedom” and “liberty” occupy a central place in the political discourse of the American founding era, yet their distinction remains a subject of scholarly debate. While these terms are often used interchangeably in both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, a closer examination of their philosophical, linguistic, and historical contexts reveals nuanced differences that reflect deeper ideological divides regarding the nature of self-government, the structure of political authority, and the protection of individual rights.
Linguistic and Philosophical Foundations
The etymological roots of “liberty” and “freedom” provide an initial point of distinction. “Liberty,” derived from the Latin libertas and Old French liberté, is historically associated with legal and institutional dimensions of self-rule, emphasizing the rights and privileges conferred by membership in a political community. In contrast, “freedom,” with its Old English origin (frēodōm), connotes a more personal or existential state, often linked to individual autonomy and the absence of external restraint (Skinner 1998; Berlin 1969). This linguistic distinction is reflected in the broader philosophical literature, where “liberty” is frequently tied to the structure and limits of political authority, while “freedom” is associated with the individual’s capacity for self-determination (Berlin 1969; Pettit 1997).
Isaiah Berlin’s influential distinction between negative and positive liberty further illuminates these concepts. Negative liberty, or “freedom from” interference, aligns with the classical liberal tradition and is often mapped onto the term “freedom.” Positive liberty, or “freedom to” realize one’s own potential or participate in collective self-governance, resonates with the republican tradition and is more closely associated with “liberty” as a political and civic ideal (Berlin 1969; Pettit 1997). However, as scholars have noted, the mapping of these philosophical distinctions onto the terms “freedom” and “liberty” is not always consistent, particularly in the context of eighteenth-century American political thought (Skinner 1998; Gienapp 2018).
Federalist Conceptions: Liberty as Ordered Self-Government
The Federalist Papers, authored by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, articulate a vision of liberty that is fundamentally tied to the structure of government and the rule of law. For the Federalists, liberty is not simply the absence of government interference, but the product of a well-constructed constitutional order that prevents the concentration and abuse of power. Madison, for example, famously asserts that “justice is the end of government… until liberty be lost in the pursuit” (Federalist No. 51), emphasizing that liberty is preserved through a system of checks and balances, federalism, and the separation of powers (Madison 1788; Rakove 1996).
In this framework, liberty is a collective good, secured by institutions that channel and restrain both governmental and popular power. The Federalists acknowledge that liberty enables the formation of factions, but argue that the solution is not to suppress liberty, but to control its effects through a large, diverse republic (Federalist No. 10). Thus, liberty is conceived as the condition in which individuals are protected from arbitrary rule, not by minimizing government, but by ensuring its accountability and representativeness (Rakove 1996; Wood 1969).
Anti-Federalist Conceptions: Freedom as Local Autonomy and Non-Domination
The Anti-Federalist Papers, in contrast, foreground the dangers of centralized authority and the erosion of local autonomy. For the Anti-Federalists, freedom is closely tied to the ability of individuals and states to govern themselves without undue interference from a distant federal government (Storing 1981). They argue that true liberty requires not only the absence of oppression, but also the active capacity for self-government at the local level. Brutus, for instance, warns that the proposed Constitution would create a government with “absolute and uncontrollable power,” threatening both state sovereignty and individual freedoms (Brutus No. 1).
The Anti-Federalists’ conception of liberty aligns with the republican ideal of non-domination, where freedom is understood as protection from arbitrary or unchecked authority (Pettit 1997). They insist that only small, local republics can adequately represent the interests of the people and safeguard their liberties. The demand for a bill of rights reflects their concern that explicit protections are necessary to prevent the encroachment of federal power on individual and state rights (Storing 1981; Cornell 1999).
Contemporary Scholarly Interpretations
Recent scholarship underscores that the distinction between freedom and liberty in the founding era is both context-dependent and ideologically charged. Linguistic analyses of founding-era texts reveal that “liberty” was more frequently used to denote political and civil rights within a constitutional order, while “freedom” could refer to both personal autonomy and collective self-determination (Gienapp 2018; COFEA Project). Intellectual historians caution against projecting modern, individualistic notions of liberty onto the Founders, emphasizing instead their communitarian understanding of self-government and the public good (Gienapp 2018; Wood 1969).
Legal scholars have critiqued originalist approaches that equate liberty with deregulation, arguing that the Founders saw a “free state” as one where the people, through representative institutions, could regulate their own rights in the public interest (Gienapp 2018). The ongoing tension between local autonomy (“freedom”) and national unity (“liberty”) reflects deeper, unresolved debates within the American constitutional tradition (Cornell 1999).
Conclusion
In sum, while “freedom” and “liberty” are often used interchangeably in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, their distinction lies in the emphasis placed on individual autonomy versus collective self-government, the structure of political authority, and the means by which rights are secured. The Federalists conceive of liberty as the product of a well-ordered constitutional system that balances competing interests and prevents tyranny, while the Anti-Federalists emphasize freedom as local autonomy and protection from centralized power. Contemporary scholarship highlights the importance of situating these terms within their historical and philosophical contexts, recognizing that the American founding tradition is marked by an enduring ambivalence—and creative tension—between the ideals of freedom and liberty.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cornell, Saul. 1999. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Gienapp, Jonathan. 2018. The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the Founding Era. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Madison, James. 1788. “Federalist No. 51.” In The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter. New York: Signet Classics.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rakove, Jack N. 1996. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New York: Vintage.
Skinner, Quentin. 1998. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Storing, Herbert J., ed. 1981. The Complete Anti-Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wood, Gordon S. 1969. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
The evolving landscape of science education has prompted a re-examination of the roles educators play in the classroom. The terms “classroom leader,” “teacher,” and “facilitator” are often used interchangeably, yet scholarly literature in the learning sciences delineates important distinctions among these roles, each carrying unique responsibilities, forms of authority, and pedagogical approaches.
Classroom Leader: Vision, Influence, and Distributed Authority
Classroom leadership, as conceptualized in the learning sciences, extends beyond the traditional notion of a teacher as the sole authority figure. Instead, it encompasses the ability to shape classroom culture, set a vision for learning, and foster an environment where both teachers and students can exercise agency and influence (Hallinger 2019). Instructional leadership, a foundational model, emphasizes the alignment of instructional and managerial roles with the overarching goal of improving student learning. This form of leadership is not limited to formal authority but is increasingly understood as a distributed process, involving collaboration among teachers, students, and other stakeholders (Lambert 2002; Hallinger 2019). In science education, classroom leaders are responsible for setting clear goals, cultivating a positive climate for inquiry, and supporting the professional growth of both themselves and their peers (Bybee 1993).
Recent research further highlights the emergence of transformational and shared leadership models, where the teacher inspires and motivates students, encourages higher engagement, and enables students to take on leadership roles themselves (Pounder 2008; Oliveira et al. 2014). In inquiry-based science classrooms, leadership may be decentralized, with students sharing control over topics and tasks, which has been shown to enhance cognitive engagement and foster a sense of ownership over learning (Oliveira et al. 2014).
Teacher: Content Expertise, Instruction, and Assessment
The role of the teacher, while historically associated with content delivery and classroom management, has undergone significant transformation in response to advances in learning science. Traditionally, teachers have been viewed as subject matter experts responsible for designing curricula, delivering content, and assessing student learning (York-Barr and Duke 2004). This role is characterized by formal authority, structured lesson planning, and direct instruction, with the teacher serving as the primary source of knowledge and evaluator of student progress (American University School of Education 2023).
However, contemporary research underscores a shift toward more student-centered approaches, where teachers are also expected to act as assessors, diagnosticians, and co-learners (Avraamidou 2014). In these contexts, teachers balance their expertise in scientific content with the need to support student inquiry, adapt instruction to diverse learners, and foster critical thinking and problem-solving skills (Windschitl et al. 2012). The teacher’s identity is thus multifaceted, shaped by personal beliefs, professional experiences, and the broader institutional context (Avraamidou 2014).
Facilitator: Process Guidance, Collaboration, and Learner Autonomy
Facilitation represents a distinct pedagogical approach that prioritizes the learning process over content transmission. In science education, facilitators guide inquiry, support group dynamics, and foster dialogic engagement, enabling students to construct knowledge collaboratively (van de Pol et al. 2010). Unlike teachers, facilitators may not always be content experts; their primary expertise lies in orchestrating productive discussions, scaffolding group work, and creating inclusive environments where all voices are valued (American University School of Education 2023).
Facilitation is particularly central in inquiry-based and project-based learning environments, where the goal is to promote student agency, critical thinking, and epistemic engagement (Hmelo-Silver and Barrows 2006). The facilitator’s role involves structuring tasks, monitoring interactions, providing timely feedback, and encouraging reflection, all while balancing guidance with learner autonomy (Mercer et al. 2019). In online and blended science classrooms, e-facilitation has become increasingly important, requiring new competencies in digital communication and community-building (Littleton and Whitelock 2005).
Comparative Analysis and Evolving Boundaries
While the distinctions among classroom leader, teacher, and facilitator are analytically useful, recent scholarship emphasizes the fluidity and overlap of these roles in contemporary science education (York-Barr and Duke 2004; Hallinger 2019). Effective educators often integrate elements of all three, adapting their stance according to the needs of their students, the goals of instruction, and the demands of the learning environment (Windschitl et al. 2012). The shift toward distributed leadership and collaborative facilitation reflects a broader movement in the learning sciences toward student-centered, inquiry-driven, and equity-oriented pedagogies (Lambert 2002; Oliveira et al. 2014).
In summary, the classroom leader sets vision and fosters a culture of inquiry and shared responsibility; the teacher brings content expertise and manages instruction and assessment; and the facilitator guides the learning process, supporting collaboration and learner autonomy. Understanding these distinctions—and their intersections—is essential for advancing effective practice and research in science education.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
Avraamidou, Lucy. 2014. “Studying Science Teacher Identity: Current Insights and Future Research Directions.” Studies in Science Education 50(2): 145–179.
Bybee, Rodger W. 1993. “Leadership, Responsibility, and Reform in Science Education.” ERIC.
Hallinger, Philip. 2019. “Instructional Leadership: Its Transformation and Globalization.” In Educational Leadership and Administration: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications, 1–22. ScienceDirect.
Hmelo-Silver, Cindy E., and Howard S. Barrows. 2006. “Goals and Strategies of a Problem-based Learning Facilitator.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Problem-based Learning 1(1): 21–39.
Lambert, Linda. 2002. The Constructivist Leader. Teachers College Press.
Littleton, Karen, and Denise Whitelock. 2005. “The Negotiation and Co-construction of Meaning and Understanding within a Postgraduate Online Learning Community.” Learning, Media and Technology 30(2): 147–164.
Mercer, Neil, Rupert Wegerif, and Lyn Dawes. 2019. “Children’s Talk and the Development of Reasoning in the Classroom.” British Educational Research Journal 25(1): 95–111.
Oliveira, Alandeom W., Ugur Boz, Gregory A. Broadwell, and Troy D. Sadler. 2014. “Student Leadership in Small Group Science Inquiry.” International Journal of Science Education 36(17): 2845–2863.
Pounder, James S. 2008. “Transformational Classroom Leadership: A Basis for Academic Staff Development.” Journal of Management Development 27(6): 616–632.
van de Pol, Janneke, Monique Volman, and Jan Beishuizen. 2010. “Scaffolding in Teacher–Student Interaction: A Decade of Research.” Educational Psychology Review 22(3): 271–296.
Windschitl, Mark, Jessica Thompson, and Melissa Braaten. 2012. “Ambitious Pedagogy by Novice Teachers: Who Benefits from Tool-supported Collaborative Inquiry in Science?” Science Education 96(5): 876–903.
York-Barr, Jennifer, and Karen Duke. 2004. “What Do We Know About Teacher Leadership? Findings from Two Decades of Scholarship.” Review of Educational Research 74(3): 255–316.
