The concepts of “freedom” and “liberty” occupy a central place in the political discourse of the American founding era, yet their distinction remains a subject of scholarly debate. While these terms are often used interchangeably in both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, a closer examination of their philosophical, linguistic, and historical contexts reveals nuanced differences that reflect deeper ideological divides regarding the nature of self-government, the structure of political authority, and the protection of individual rights.
Linguistic and Philosophical Foundations
The etymological roots of “liberty” and “freedom” provide an initial point of distinction. “Liberty,” derived from the Latin libertas and Old French liberté, is historically associated with legal and institutional dimensions of self-rule, emphasizing the rights and privileges conferred by membership in a political community. In contrast, “freedom,” with its Old English origin (frēodōm), connotes a more personal or existential state, often linked to individual autonomy and the absence of external restraint (Skinner 1998; Berlin 1969). This linguistic distinction is reflected in the broader philosophical literature, where “liberty” is frequently tied to the structure and limits of political authority, while “freedom” is associated with the individual’s capacity for self-determination (Berlin 1969; Pettit 1997).
Isaiah Berlin’s influential distinction between negative and positive liberty further illuminates these concepts. Negative liberty, or “freedom from” interference, aligns with the classical liberal tradition and is often mapped onto the term “freedom.” Positive liberty, or “freedom to” realize one’s own potential or participate in collective self-governance, resonates with the republican tradition and is more closely associated with “liberty” as a political and civic ideal (Berlin 1969; Pettit 1997). However, as scholars have noted, the mapping of these philosophical distinctions onto the terms “freedom” and “liberty” is not always consistent, particularly in the context of eighteenth-century American political thought (Skinner 1998; Gienapp 2018).
Federalist Conceptions: Liberty as Ordered Self-Government
The Federalist Papers, authored by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, articulate a vision of liberty that is fundamentally tied to the structure of government and the rule of law. For the Federalists, liberty is not simply the absence of government interference, but the product of a well-constructed constitutional order that prevents the concentration and abuse of power. Madison, for example, famously asserts that “justice is the end of government… until liberty be lost in the pursuit” (Federalist No. 51), emphasizing that liberty is preserved through a system of checks and balances, federalism, and the separation of powers (Madison 1788; Rakove 1996).
In this framework, liberty is a collective good, secured by institutions that channel and restrain both governmental and popular power. The Federalists acknowledge that liberty enables the formation of factions, but argue that the solution is not to suppress liberty, but to control its effects through a large, diverse republic (Federalist No. 10). Thus, liberty is conceived as the condition in which individuals are protected from arbitrary rule, not by minimizing government, but by ensuring its accountability and representativeness (Rakove 1996; Wood 1969).
Anti-Federalist Conceptions: Freedom as Local Autonomy and Non-Domination
The Anti-Federalist Papers, in contrast, foreground the dangers of centralized authority and the erosion of local autonomy. For the Anti-Federalists, freedom is closely tied to the ability of individuals and states to govern themselves without undue interference from a distant federal government (Storing 1981). They argue that true liberty requires not only the absence of oppression, but also the active capacity for self-government at the local level. Brutus, for instance, warns that the proposed Constitution would create a government with “absolute and uncontrollable power,” threatening both state sovereignty and individual freedoms (Brutus No. 1).
The Anti-Federalists’ conception of liberty aligns with the republican ideal of non-domination, where freedom is understood as protection from arbitrary or unchecked authority (Pettit 1997). They insist that only small, local republics can adequately represent the interests of the people and safeguard their liberties. The demand for a bill of rights reflects their concern that explicit protections are necessary to prevent the encroachment of federal power on individual and state rights (Storing 1981; Cornell 1999).
Contemporary Scholarly Interpretations
Recent scholarship underscores that the distinction between freedom and liberty in the founding era is both context-dependent and ideologically charged. Linguistic analyses of founding-era texts reveal that “liberty” was more frequently used to denote political and civil rights within a constitutional order, while “freedom” could refer to both personal autonomy and collective self-determination (Gienapp 2018; COFEA Project). Intellectual historians caution against projecting modern, individualistic notions of liberty onto the Founders, emphasizing instead their communitarian understanding of self-government and the public good (Gienapp 2018; Wood 1969).
Legal scholars have critiqued originalist approaches that equate liberty with deregulation, arguing that the Founders saw a “free state” as one where the people, through representative institutions, could regulate their own rights in the public interest (Gienapp 2018). The ongoing tension between local autonomy (“freedom”) and national unity (“liberty”) reflects deeper, unresolved debates within the American constitutional tradition (Cornell 1999).
Conclusion
In sum, while “freedom” and “liberty” are often used interchangeably in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, their distinction lies in the emphasis placed on individual autonomy versus collective self-government, the structure of political authority, and the means by which rights are secured. The Federalists conceive of liberty as the product of a well-ordered constitutional system that balances competing interests and prevents tyranny, while the Anti-Federalists emphasize freedom as local autonomy and protection from centralized power. Contemporary scholarship highlights the importance of situating these terms within their historical and philosophical contexts, recognizing that the American founding tradition is marked by an enduring ambivalence—and creative tension—between the ideals of freedom and liberty.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cornell, Saul. 1999. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Gienapp, Jonathan. 2018. The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the Founding Era. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Madison, James. 1788. “Federalist No. 51.” In The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter. New York: Signet Classics.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rakove, Jack N. 1996. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New York: Vintage.
Skinner, Quentin. 1998. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Storing, Herbert J., ed. 1981. The Complete Anti-Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wood, Gordon S. 1969. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
The Bible teaches two different but connected ideas: people are made in the “image of God” (Genesis 1:26–27), and marriage is “like” the relationship between Christ and the Church (Ephesians 5:22–33). Being made in God’s image is an ontological reality, meaning it is built into what it means to be human. Every person, simply by being human, reflects God in a unique way and has dignity, purpose, and responsibility. This image was damaged by sin but is restored through Christ. Marriage, on the other hand, is an analogy, not a literal reflection of God’s being. Paul uses marriage as a way to illustrate how Christ loves the Church and how the Church responds to Him. This does not mean marriage and the Christ-Church relationship are the same, but that marriage serves as a living example of sacrificial love, mutual respect, and unity. Put simply, the image of God describes who all people are, while marriage points beyond itself to the gospel and the ultimate union of Christ and His people.
The distinction between God creating humanity in His “image” (Genesis 1:26–27) and the Christian marriage being “like” Christ and His Church (Ephesians 5:22–33) is foundational for biblical anthropology, ecclesiology, and Christian ethics. This analysis, informed by the authority of Scripture and the ordering of God’s commandments, explores the ontological and analogical dimensions of these two concepts, drawing on biblical exegesis and peer-reviewed theological scholarship.
1. Ontological Reality: The Imago Dei
1.1. The Meaning of “Image” (Tselem) in Genesis 1:26–27
The Hebrew term tselem (“image”) in Genesis 1:26–27 signifies that humanity is created as a real, though finite, reflection of God’s being. Scholarly consensus affirms that “image” here denotes a representative function—humans are appointed as God’s vice-regents, reflecting His character and exercising stewardship over creation (Middleton 2005, 27; Clines 1968, 53). The image is not a physical likeness but a status and vocation: to represent God’s rule, to relate to Him and others, and to exercise moral and rational capacities (Wenham 1987, 30; Westermann 1984, 146).
1.2. Ontological Distinction
The imago Dei is ontological: it is a reality of human existence, grounded in the act of creation. All humans, by virtue of being human, bear the image of God. This image is intrinsic, not merely functional or relational, though it is expressed in relationship and vocation (Hoekema 1986, 69; Barth 1960, 187). The image is not lost in the Fall, though it is marred; it is restored and perfected in Christ (Colossians 1:15; Ephesians 4:24).
1.3. Theological Significance
The imago Dei grounds human dignity, equality, and moral responsibility. It is the ontological basis for the command to love God and neighbor (Matthew 22:37–40), and for the ethical imperative to treat all people with respect and justice (Middleton 2005, 27; Hoekema 1986, 69).
2. Analogical Relationship: Marriage as “Like” Christ and the Church
2.1. The Analogy in Ephesians 5:22–33
In Ephesians 5:22–33, Paul employs the Greek comparative terms hōs (“as”) and kathōs (“just as”) to draw an analogy between the marital relationship and the relationship between Christ and the Church. This analogy is not ontological but analogical: marriage is not the same as the Christ-Church union, but it is patterned after it (Lincoln 1990, 373; Barth 1974, 613).
2.2. Analogical, Not Identical
Scholars emphasize that the analogy is meant to illuminate the character and quality of marriage by reference to the Christ-Church relationship, but not to equate the two in substance or essence (Lincoln 1990, 373; Witherington 2007, 337). The use of “as” and “just as” signals that the marital relationship is a reflection, a sign, or a type of the greater reality of Christ’s sacrificial love and the Church’s responsive devotion (O’Brien 1999, 425).
2.3. Theological and Ethical Implications
The analogy serves as an ethical paradigm: husbands are called to love sacrificially, as Christ loved the Church; wives are called to respect and respond, as the Church does to Christ. The analogy transforms Greco-Roman household codes by rooting marital roles in Christlike love and mutual submission (Eph. 5:21; Lincoln 1990, 373). The relationship is mutual, self-giving, and oriented toward sanctification and unity (Witherington 2007, 337).
3. Ontological vs. Analogical: The Core Difference
3.1. Ontological (Imago Dei)
Nature: Real, intrinsic, and universal to all humanity.
Ground: God’s creative act; humanity’s very being.
Function: Representation, relationship, and vocation as God’s image-bearers.
Theological Implication: Human dignity, equality, and moral responsibility are grounded in being made in God’s image (Middleton 2005, 27; Hoekema 1986, 69).
3.2. Analogical (Marriage as “Like” Christ and the Church)
Nature: Analogical, illustrative, and typological.
Ground: Patterned after the redemptive relationship between Christ and the Church.
Function: Ethical paradigm for Christian marriage; a sign pointing to a greater spiritual reality.
Theological Implication: Marriage is a living parable of the gospel, calling spouses to embody Christlike love and mutual submission (Lincoln 1990, 373; O’Brien 1999, 425).
3.3. Covenant Theology Perspective
Covenant theology further clarifies the distinction: the imago Dei is rooted in the covenant of creation, establishing humanity’s status and vocation before God. The marriage analogy, by contrast, is rooted in the new covenant, where marriage becomes a sign of the union between Christ and His redeemed people (Robertson 1980, 93; Witsius 1822, 1:27). The former is ontological and universal; the latter is analogical and redemptive-historical.
4. Exegetical Narrative: Genesis 1:26–27 and Ephesians 5:22–33
The contrast between ontology and analogy comes into sharper focus when we turn to the biblical texts themselves. Genesis 1 narrates humanity’s creation in God’s image, while Ephesians 5 reframes the household code in light of the Christ-Church relationship. Together, these passages illustrate how Scripture grounds both anthropology and ecclesiology in complementary yet distinct ways.
4.1. Genesis 1:26–27
Genre and Context: Genesis is narrative, recounting the creation of the world and humanity. The context is the inauguration of humanity’s unique role in creation.
Textual Analysis: “Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness… So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.’”
The repetition of “image” and “likeness” underscores the representative and relational nature of humanity’s creation.
The plural “let us” hints at the relationality within God, echoed in the creation of humanity as male and female (Barth 1960, 187).
The image is not a physical resemblance but a status and vocation: to represent God, exercise dominion, and live in relationship (Middleton 2005, 27).
4.2. Ephesians 5:22–33
Genre and Context: Ephesians is an epistle, addressing the ethical and theological life of the church. The immediate context is the “household code,” reinterpreted in light of the gospel.
Textual Analysis: “Wives, submit to your own husbands, as to the Lord… Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her… This mystery is profound, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church.”
The repeated use of “as” and “just as” (hōs, kathōs) signals analogy, not identity (Lincoln 1990, 373).
The passage is structured around mutual submission (Eph. 5:21) and sacrificial love, transforming ancient household norms (Witherington 2007, 337).
The “mystery” (mystērion) is the revelation that marriage points beyond itself to the union of Christ and the Church (O’Brien 1999, 425).
Conclusion
The difference between God making man in His “image” and Christian marriage being “like” Christ and His Church is fundamentally the difference between ontological reality and analogical relationship. The imago Dei is an intrinsic, ontological status bestowed on all humanity by God’s creative act, grounding human dignity, vocation, and moral responsibility. In contrast, the analogy of marriage to Christ and the Church is a typological and ethical paradigm, calling Christian spouses to embody the gospel in their relationship. The former is universal and foundational to human identity; the latter is particular, redemptive-historical, and points beyond itself to the ultimate eschatological union of Christ and His people (Rev. 19:7–9).
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
Barth, Karl. 1960. Church Dogmatics, Vol. III/1: The Doctrine of Creation. Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
Clines, David J. A. 1968. “The Image of God in Man.” Tyndale Bulletin 19: 53–103.
Hoekema, Anthony A. 1986. Created in God’s Image. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Lincoln, Andrew T. 1990. Ephesians. Word Biblical Commentary, Vol. 42. Dallas: Word Books.
Middleton, J. Richard. 2005. The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1. Grand Rapids: Brazos.
O’Brien, Peter T. 1999. The Letter to the Ephesians. Pillar New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Robertson, O. Palmer. 1980. The Christ of the Covenants. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed.
Westermann, Claus. 1984. Genesis 1–11: A Commentary. Minneapolis: Augsburg.
Wenham, Gordon J. 1987. Genesis 1–15. Word Biblical Commentary, Vol. 1. Dallas: Word Books.
Witherington, Ben, III. 2007. The Letters to Philemon, the Colossians, and the Ephesians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on the Captivity Epistles. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Witsius, Herman. 1822. The Economy of the Covenants Between God and Man. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Doig and Stirling.
With global connectivity and digital relationships, the question of how we determine our moral responsibilities to those near and far has become increasingly urgent. The “ethics of proximity” addresses this very issue, challenging Christians to consider how physical, relational, and even digital closeness shapes our obligations to others. This exploration of the ethics of proximity draws on biblical foundations, philosophical insights, and contemporary Christian ethical thought, offering a framework for those seeking to live out their faith in a complex world.
Biblical Foundations: From Neighbor to Stranger
Scripture provides for understanding the ethics of proximity. In the Old Testament, moral obligations are often structured around familial and communal ties. The laws of ancient Israel, such as those concerning the care of widows, orphans, and strangers, reflect a hierarchy of responsibility that begins with one’s family and extends outward to the broader community (Exodus 22:21-24; Leviticus 19:9-18). The prophetic tradition, however, pushes these boundaries, calling for justice and compassion that reach beyond immediate kin to include the marginalized and oppressed (Isaiah 1:17; Micah 6:8) (Williams 1968).
The New Testament radically expands this vision. Christ’s parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) redefines “neighbor” not as someone who is physically or socially close, but as anyone in need, regardless of background or proximity. This teaching challenges believers to transcend traditional boundaries and to see every person as worthy of compassion and justice (Stassen and Gushee 2016). Paul further develops this ethic, describing the church as a body in which each member is responsible for the well-being of others, thus emphasizing a spiritual and communal proximity that can override physical distance (1 Corinthians 12:12-27) (Bloomquist 2009).
Philosophical and Theological Insights: Encounter and Responsibility
Philosopher Emmanuel Levinas offers a perspective on the ethics of proximity, arguing that ethical responsibility arises most powerfully in face-to-face encounters with others. For Levinas, the presence of another person—especially one who is vulnerable—demands a response that precedes any abstract moral calculation. This “asymmetrical” relationship means that our obligation to others is not based on reciprocity or mutual benefit, but on the sheer fact of their presence and need (Levinas 1985). Such a view resonates deeply with Christian teachings on neighbor love, as it calls believers to prioritize concrete acts of care over distant or theoretical commitments (Logstrup 1997).
The ethics of proximity also aligns with the “ethics of care,” a framework that emphasizes the moral significance of relationships and attentiveness to the needs of those around us. Both approaches critique ethical systems that prioritize universal rules at the expense of personal engagement, insisting that genuine moral action is rooted in the particularities of lived experience and community (Held 2006).
Proximity, Social Justice, and Community Engagement
For Christians , the ethics of proximity is inseparable from the pursuit of justice and community engagement. Daniel Day Williams argues that love, as understood in Christian ethics, is not merely an abstract ideal but is realized in the pursuit of justice and reconciliation within society (Williams 1968). The Scriptural command to “love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:39) is thus not limited to personal relationships but extends to advocacy for the marginalized and the transformation of unjust structures (Stassen and Gushee 2016).
Civic engagement at the neighborhood level—whether through volunteering, activism, or simply building relationships—embodies the ethics of proximity by addressing the needs of those closest to us while also recognizing our interconnectedness with the wider world. In this way, proximity becomes both a starting point and a testing ground for broader commitments to justice and compassion (Bloomquist 2009).
Proximity in a Digital Age
The rise of digital technology and social media has complicated traditional notions of proximity. While physical closeness once defined our primary moral obligations, virtual interactions now create new forms of relational proximity that can be just as ethically significant. Online communities, for example, can foster genuine care and support, but they also raise questions about privacy, authenticity, and the limits of our responsibility (Buchanan and Zimmer 2021). For Christians, navigating these digital spaces requires a renewed attentiveness to the needs of others, a commitment to respectful engagement, and a willingness to extend neighbor love beyond physical boundaries.
Conclusion
The ethics of proximity challenges Christians—especially those in the digital, globalized world—to rethink how we define and prioritize our moral responsibilities. Rooted in Scripture, enriched by philosophical reflection, and oriented toward justice and community, this ethic calls us to respond to the needs of those both near and far, in person and online. Ultimately, it is an invitation to embody the radical love of Christ in every sphere of our lives.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
For justice, two distinct yet complementary approaches have emerged as vital tools for addressing historical injustices and human rights violations: transitional justice and restorative justice. These frameworks strive to heal societies marred by conflict and systemic abuse, bridging the gap between restorative and transitional Justice in addressing historical Injustices and hoping for reconciliation, accountability, and healing.
Transitional Justice: A Framework for Change
Transitional justice is designed to address large-scale past abuses during political transitions. This multifaceted approach includes tribunals, truth commissions, reparations, and institutional reforms aimed at recognizing victims and promoting reconciliation (Theidon, 2018; Andreevska, 2013). These mechanisms can be endogenous or exogenous, depending on whether they are implemented internally by the society or externally by international actors (Kaminski et al., 2006). The challenges in this field often involve balancing peace with justice, ensuring accountability, and addressing the needs of vulnerable populations (de Hoon, 2020).
Restorative Justice: Healing Through Dialogue
Restorative justice shifts the focus from punishment to healing, prioritizing the restoration of harm and societal repair (Pointer, 2020). This approach has shown efficacy in diverse contexts, such as post-conflict reconciliation in Northern Uganda and international criminal proceedings (Thomas & Gardner, 2014; Henham, 2009). It fosters victim engagement, dialogue, and future-oriented outcomes, leading to profound personal and relational transformations (Savage, 2007; Pointer, 2020). Despite its promise, restorative justice faces significant systemic barriers, including institutional inertia and structural inequities (Savage, 2007; Pointer, 2020). Victim-offender dialogues, supported by Mark Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson Armour’s research, can lead to healing and accountability when properly facilitated (Umbreit & Armour, 2010).
Integrating Justice Approaches
The integration of restorative principles into show trials, often seen as political spectacles, presents an intriguing possibility. While show trials are typically associated with predetermined outcomes and political agendas, incorporating restorative elements could enhance truth-telling and community healing (Cook, 2016; Hughes, 2015). This hybrid approach would require careful balance between accountability and due process, ensuring fairness and transparency (Fairlie, 2004; McDermott, 2016).
Challenges and Opportunities
Applying restorative justice to severe human rights violations involves addressing power imbalances and ensuring victim safety. This approach offers a victim-centric framework that prioritizes healing and systemic change (Braithwaite, 2016; Llewellyn & Philpott, 2014). However, challenges such as re-traumatization risks and addressing large-scale harms require careful consideration.
Future Directions
Further research is needed to explore restorative justice’s long-term impacts and its potential in complex contexts. Developing best practices for implementing restorative principles in severe cases will be crucial for advancing these justice frameworks. Additionally, studies examining the integration of restorative elements into transitional justice processes could provide valuable insights into creating more holistic approaches to addressing historical injustices.
Conclusion
Restorative and transitional justice offer promising avenues for addressing historical injustices and promoting societal healing. By prioritizing victim narratives, fostering dialogue, and ensuring accountability, these frameworks can contribute to transforming societies and preventing future violations. As the field evolves, continued scholarly inquiry and practical innovation will be essential in realizing their full potential.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
– Andreevska, J. (2013). Transitional justice in post-conflict societies. – Braithwaite, J. (2016). Restorative justice and responsive regulation. – Cook, S. (2006). Show trials and the politics of justice. – de Hoon, M. (2020). Balancing peace and justice in transitional societies. – Fairlie, M. (2004). Ensuring fair trials in international tribunals. – Henham, R. (2009). Restorative justice and international criminal proceedings. – Hughes, E. (2015). The performative nature of show trials. – Kaminski, M., Nalepa, M., & O’Neill, B. (2006). Endogenous and exogenous transitional justice. – Llewellyn, J., & Philpott, D. (2014). Restorative justice in international contexts. – McDermott, Y. (2016). Due process in international criminal law. – Pointer, L. (2020). Restorative justice: A new paradigm for justice. – Savage, S. (2007). Systemic barriers to restorative justice. – Theidon, K. (2018). Truth commissions and transitional justice. – Thomas, E., & Gardner, J. (2014). Post-conflict reconciliation in Northern Uganda. – Umbreit, M. S., & Armour, M. P. (2010). Victim-offender dialogues in restorative justice.
I wish you bad luck from time to time in the years to come, I hope you will be treated unfairly so that you will come to know the value of justice.
I hope that you will suffer betrayal because that will teach you the importance of loyalty.
I hope you will be lonely from time to time so that you don’t take friends for granted.
I wish you bad luck, again, from time to time so that you will be conscious of the role of chance in life and understand that your success is not completely deserved and that the failure of others is not completely deserved either.
And when you lose, as you will from time to time, I hope every now and then, your opponent will gloat over your failure. It is a way for you to understand the importance of sportsmanship.
I hope you’ll be ignored so you know the importance of listening to others, and I hope you will have just enough pain to learn compassion.
Whether I wish these things or not, they’re going to happen. And whether you benefit from them or not will depend upon your ability to see the message in your misfortunes.
The least of these are the poor, the hungry, the homeless, the sick, the imprisoned, and the oppressed. In Matthew 25:35-40, Jesus says:
For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.’
“Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and come to visit you?’
“The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.'”
Jesus taught us that when we help those in need, we are helping Him. He also taught that we should love our neighbors as ourselves (Mark 12:31). This means that we should love, regardless of social status.
In the Bible, there are many examples of people who showed compassion for the least of these. For example, the Good Samaritan helped a man who had been beaten and robbed, even though he was a stranger to him (Luke 10:25-37). Ruth took care of her mother-in-law, Naomi, even though she was a widow from a foreign land (Ruth 1:16-18). And Job showed compassion for the poor and needy, even though he had lost everything himself (Job 29:12-16).
When we show compassion for the least of these, we are following the example of Jesus and obeying His commands. We are also making the world a better place.
Brandon L. Blankenship is an assistant professor, continuing legal education presenter, and business educator. He and his wife Donnalee live on their hobby farm south of Birmingham, Alabama.
