The concepts of “freedom” and “liberty” occupy a central place in the political discourse of the American founding era, yet their distinction remains a subject of scholarly debate. While these terms are often used interchangeably in both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, a closer examination of their philosophical, linguistic, and historical contexts reveals nuanced differences that reflect deeper ideological divides regarding the nature of self-government, the structure of political authority, and the protection of individual rights.
Linguistic and Philosophical Foundations
The etymological roots of “liberty” and “freedom” provide an initial point of distinction. “Liberty,” derived from the Latin libertas and Old French liberté, is historically associated with legal and institutional dimensions of self-rule, emphasizing the rights and privileges conferred by membership in a political community. In contrast, “freedom,” with its Old English origin (frēodōm), connotes a more personal or existential state, often linked to individual autonomy and the absence of external restraint (Skinner 1998; Berlin 1969). This linguistic distinction is reflected in the broader philosophical literature, where “liberty” is frequently tied to the structure and limits of political authority, while “freedom” is associated with the individual’s capacity for self-determination (Berlin 1969; Pettit 1997).
Isaiah Berlin’s influential distinction between negative and positive liberty further illuminates these concepts. Negative liberty, or “freedom from” interference, aligns with the classical liberal tradition and is often mapped onto the term “freedom.” Positive liberty, or “freedom to” realize one’s own potential or participate in collective self-governance, resonates with the republican tradition and is more closely associated with “liberty” as a political and civic ideal (Berlin 1969; Pettit 1997). However, as scholars have noted, the mapping of these philosophical distinctions onto the terms “freedom” and “liberty” is not always consistent, particularly in the context of eighteenth-century American political thought (Skinner 1998; Gienapp 2018).
Federalist Conceptions: Liberty as Ordered Self-Government
The Federalist Papers, authored by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, articulate a vision of liberty that is fundamentally tied to the structure of government and the rule of law. For the Federalists, liberty is not simply the absence of government interference, but the product of a well-constructed constitutional order that prevents the concentration and abuse of power. Madison, for example, famously asserts that “justice is the end of government… until liberty be lost in the pursuit” (Federalist No. 51), emphasizing that liberty is preserved through a system of checks and balances, federalism, and the separation of powers (Madison 1788; Rakove 1996).
In this framework, liberty is a collective good, secured by institutions that channel and restrain both governmental and popular power. The Federalists acknowledge that liberty enables the formation of factions, but argue that the solution is not to suppress liberty, but to control its effects through a large, diverse republic (Federalist No. 10). Thus, liberty is conceived as the condition in which individuals are protected from arbitrary rule, not by minimizing government, but by ensuring its accountability and representativeness (Rakove 1996; Wood 1969).
Anti-Federalist Conceptions: Freedom as Local Autonomy and Non-Domination
The Anti-Federalist Papers, in contrast, foreground the dangers of centralized authority and the erosion of local autonomy. For the Anti-Federalists, freedom is closely tied to the ability of individuals and states to govern themselves without undue interference from a distant federal government (Storing 1981). They argue that true liberty requires not only the absence of oppression, but also the active capacity for self-government at the local level. Brutus, for instance, warns that the proposed Constitution would create a government with “absolute and uncontrollable power,” threatening both state sovereignty and individual freedoms (Brutus No. 1).
The Anti-Federalists’ conception of liberty aligns with the republican ideal of non-domination, where freedom is understood as protection from arbitrary or unchecked authority (Pettit 1997). They insist that only small, local republics can adequately represent the interests of the people and safeguard their liberties. The demand for a bill of rights reflects their concern that explicit protections are necessary to prevent the encroachment of federal power on individual and state rights (Storing 1981; Cornell 1999).
Contemporary Scholarly Interpretations
Recent scholarship underscores that the distinction between freedom and liberty in the founding era is both context-dependent and ideologically charged. Linguistic analyses of founding-era texts reveal that “liberty” was more frequently used to denote political and civil rights within a constitutional order, while “freedom” could refer to both personal autonomy and collective self-determination (Gienapp 2018; COFEA Project). Intellectual historians caution against projecting modern, individualistic notions of liberty onto the Founders, emphasizing instead their communitarian understanding of self-government and the public good (Gienapp 2018; Wood 1969).
Legal scholars have critiqued originalist approaches that equate liberty with deregulation, arguing that the Founders saw a “free state” as one where the people, through representative institutions, could regulate their own rights in the public interest (Gienapp 2018). The ongoing tension between local autonomy (“freedom”) and national unity (“liberty”) reflects deeper, unresolved debates within the American constitutional tradition (Cornell 1999).
Conclusion
In sum, while “freedom” and “liberty” are often used interchangeably in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers, their distinction lies in the emphasis placed on individual autonomy versus collective self-government, the structure of political authority, and the means by which rights are secured. The Federalists conceive of liberty as the product of a well-ordered constitutional system that balances competing interests and prevents tyranny, while the Anti-Federalists emphasize freedom as local autonomy and protection from centralized power. Contemporary scholarship highlights the importance of situating these terms within their historical and philosophical contexts, recognizing that the American founding tradition is marked by an enduring ambivalence—and creative tension—between the ideals of freedom and liberty.
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References
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cornell, Saul. 1999. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Gienapp, Jonathan. 2018. The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the Founding Era. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Madison, James. 1788. “Federalist No. 51.” In The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter. New York: Signet Classics.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rakove, Jack N. 1996. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New York: Vintage.
Skinner, Quentin. 1998. Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Storing, Herbert J., ed. 1981. The Complete Anti-Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wood, Gordon S. 1969. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
